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Abstract. This paper investigates the resilience and robustness of Deep
Reinforcement Learning (DRL) policies to adversarial perturbations in
the state space. Accordingly, we first present an approach for the disen-
tanglement of vulnerabilities caused by representation learning of DRL
agents from those that stem from the sensitivity of the DRL policies
to distributional shifts in state transitions. Building on this approach,
we propose two RL-based techniques for quantitative benchmarking of
adversarial resilience and robustness in DRL policies against perturba-
tions of state transitions. We demonstrate the feasibility of our proposals
through experimental evaluation of resilience and robustness in DQN,
A2C, and PPO2 policies trained in the Cartpole environment.
Keywords: Deep Reinforcement Learning · Adversarial Attack · Policy
Generalization · Resilience · robustness · benchmarking.
1 Introduction
Since the reports by Behzadan & Munir [1] and Huang et al. [5], the primary
emphasis of the state of the art in DRL security [2] has been on the vulnerability
of policies to state-space perturbations. In particular, the manipulation of the
policy via adversarial examples [4] has remained the main focus of current liter-
ature on this issue. However, this bias towards adversarial example attacks gives
rise to a critical shortcoming: the analyses of such attacks fail to disentangle
the vulnerability caused by the learned representation and that which is due to
the sensitivity of the DRL dynamics to distributional shifts in state transitions.
Also, the performance of defenses proposed for adversarial example attacks are
inherently limited to the considered attack mechanisms. As the most successful
technique for mitigation of adversarial examples, adversarial training is known
to enhance the robustness of machine learning models to the type of attack used
for generating the training adversarial examples, while leaving the model vul-
nerable to other types of attacks[8]. Furthermore, the current literature fails to
provide solutions and approaches which can be used in practice to evaluate and
improve the robustness and resilience of DRL policies to attacks that exploit
the sensitivity to state transitions. Also, there remains a need for quantitative
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approaches to measure and benchmark the resilience and robustness of DRL
policies in a reusable and generalizable manner.
In response to these shortcomings, this paper aims to address the problem
of quantifying and benchmarking the robustness and resilience of a DRL agent
to adversarial perturbations of state transitions at test-time, in a manner that
is independent of the attack type. This improves the generalization of current
techniques that analyze the model against specific adversarial example attacks.
Accordingly, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We present formulations of the resilience and robustness problems that en-
able the disentanglement of limitation in representation learning from sensi-
tivity of policies to state transition dynamics.
2. We propose two RL-based techniques and corresponding metrics for the mea-
surement and benchmarking of resilience and robustness of DRL policies to
perturbations of state transitions,
3. We demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal through experimental evalu-
ation of their performance on DQN, A2C, and PPO2 agents trained in the
Cartpole environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines and
formulates the problems of adversarial resilience and robustness in DRL. Our
proposed methods for benchmarking the test-time resilience and robustness of
DRL policies are presented in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 provides the details
of experimental setup for evaluating the performance of our proposals, with the
corresponding results presented in Section 6. The paper concludes in Section 7
with a summary of findings and remarks on future directions of research.
2 Problem Formulation
We consider the the generic problem of RL in the settings of a Markov Decision
Process (MDP), described by the tuple MDP :=< S,A,R,P >, where S is
the set of reachable states in the process, A is the set of available actions, R
is the mapping of transitions to the immediate reward, and P represents the
transition probabilities (i.e., state dynamics), which are initially unknown to
RL agents. At any given time-step t, the MDP is at a state st ∈ S. The RL
agent’s choice of action at time t, at ∈ A causes a transition from st to a state
st+1 according to the transition probability P (st+1|st, at). The agent receives a
reward rt+1 = R(st, at, st+1) for choosing the action at at state st. Interactions
of the agent with MDP are determined by the policy π. When such interactions
are deterministic, the policy π : S → A is a mapping between the states and
their corresponding actions. A stochastic policy π(s) represents the probability
distribution of implementing any action a ∈ A at state s. The goal of RL is
to learn a policy that maximizes the expected discounted return E[Rt], where
Rt =
∑
∞
k=0 γ
krt+k; with rt denoting the instantaneous reward received at time
t, and γ is a discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1].
To facilitate the formal statement of adversarial resilience and robustness,
we first introduce the following definitions:
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– Adversarial Regret at time T is the difference between return obtained
by the nominal (unperturbed) agent at time T and the return obtained
by the perturbed agent at time T . Formally: Rˆadv(T ) = Rnominal(T ) −
Rperturbed(T ). The time T may represent either the terminal timestep of an
episode, or the time-horizon of interest in the analysis.
– Adversarial Budget is defined by the one or more of the following pa-
rameters: the maximum number of features that can be perturbed in the
observations (Omax ∈ [0,∞] ), the maximum number of observations that
can be perturbed ( Nmax ∈ [0,∞] ), and the probability of perturbing each
observation ( P (perturb) ∈ [0, 1] ).
Building on these two concepts, we define the problems of adversarial re-
silience and robustness as follows:
1. Test-Time Resilience: The minimum number of state perturbations re-
quired to incur the maximum reduction to the total return at time T (de-
noted by Rˆadv(T )) for an agent driven by a policy π(s) in an environment
with transition dynamics P.
2. Test-Time Robustness: The maximum adversarial regret Rˆadv(T ) = ǫmax
achievable via a maximum of δmax state perturbations for an agent driven
by a policy π(s) in an environment with transition dynamics P.
The following sections provide the details of our proposed solutions to each
of the aforementioned problem settings.
3 Benchmarking of Test-Time Resilience
This problem can be modeled as that of finding an optimal adversarial policy
πadv(s) that minimizes the cost incurred to the adversary Cadv in order to im-
pose the maximum adversarial regret Rˆadv(T ), the worst-case value of which is
the highest cumulative reward achieved by the target policy Rmax. Our proposed
approach is through the formulation of this problem in the settings of reinforce-
ment learning. The state space in the corresponding MDP is the set of states
in the target MDP, augmented with the action of the target in that state, i.e.,
S′ = {∀s ∈ S : (s, π(s))}. For the purpose of measuring a lower-bound for the
resilience, we consider the worst-case white-box adversary, which is able to im-
pose targeted state perturbations with 100% success rate, to induce any action
within the permissible action-set of the target A which has the lowest Q-value
at any state s according to the target’s optimal state-action value function Q∗.
In this case, the set of permissible adversarial actions at any state s is given by:
Aadv(s) = {No Action} ∪A \ π
∗(s) (1)
Where A is the action set of the targeted agent, and π : S → A is the policy
of the targeted agent. In the proposed approach, the adversarial reward value is
determined via the procedure detailed in Algorithm 1:
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Algorithm 1 Reward Assignment of RL Agent for Measuring Adversarial Re-
silience
Require: Target policy pi∗, Perturbation cost function cadv(., .), Maximum achievable
score Rmax, Optimal state-action value function Q
∗(., .), Current adversarial policy
piadv, Current state st, Current count of adversarial actions AdvCount, Current score
Rt
Set ToPerturb ← piadv(st)
if ToPerturb is False then
at ← pi
∗(st)
Reward← 0
else
a′t ← argmina Q
∗(st, a)
Reward← −cadv(st, a
′
t)
end if
if either st or s
′
t is terminal then
Reward+ = (Rmax −Rt)
end if
where c(st, a
′
t) is the cost of imposing the state perturbation which induces
the adversarial action a′t at state st. It is noteworthy that if the value of c(st, a
′
t)
is invariant with respect to a′t, the adversarial action set reduces to:
Aadv(s) = {No Action, Induce argmin
a
Q(s, a)} (2)
To obtain the test-time resilience of policy π∗ to state perturbations, we
propose the following procedure:
1. If the state-action value function of the target Q∗ is not available (i.e., black-
box testing), approximate Q∗ via policy imitation [6].
2. Train the adversarial agent against the target following π in its training envi-
ronment, report the optimal adversarial return R∗perturbed and the maximum
adversarial regret R∗adv(T ).
3. Apply the adversarial policy against the target in N episodes, record total
cost Cadv for each episode,
4. Report the average of Cadv over N episodes as the mean test-time resilience
of π in the given environment.
This procedure introduces 3 metrics for the quantification of test-time resilience:
the optimal adversarial return R∗perturbed achieved in the training process of
the adversarial policy, the maximum adversarial regret R∗adv(T ) achieved during
training, and the mean per-episode of the total cost Cadv. These metrics provide
the means to benchmark and compare the test-time resilience of different policies
trained to optimize the agent’s performance in a given environment.
For the purpose of measuring resilience, we consider convergence to be reached
if the average adversarial regret over 200 episodes remains constant. This defini-
tion relaxes the instabilities that may arise due to the configuration and architec-
ture of the DRL training process. It is noteworthy that depending on the training
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algorithm and design parameters, this procedure is not guaranteed to converge
to the global optimal. However, by reporting the number of iterations and config-
uration of random number generators with a constant seed, the reported results
present a reproducible loose lower bound on the adversarial resilience of the tar-
get. Also, the trained adversarial policy can be used to test other policies for
comparison of such lower-bounds under the same adversarial strategy.
4 Benchmarking of Test-Time Robustness
For this problem, we propose a modified version of the procedure developed
for benchmarking the test-time resilience. Accordingly, the reward function is
adjusted to account for the lack of a target ǫ, as well as the addition of an
adversarial budget constraint δmax. The reward measurement of this process is
outlined in Algorithm 2:
Algorithm 2 Reward Assignment of RL Agent for Measuring Adversarial Ro-
bustness
Require: Maximum perturbation budget δmax, Perturbation cost function cadv(., .),
Maximum achievable score Rmax, Optimal state-action value function Q
∗(., .), Cur-
rent adversarial policy piadv, Current state s, Current count of adversarial actions
AdvCount, Current score Rt
Set AdversarialAction ← piadv(s)
if AdversarialAction is NoAction then
Reward← 0
else if AdvCount ≥ δmax then
Reward← −cadv(s,AdversarialAction)× δmax
AdvCount+ = 1
else
Reward← −cadv(s,AdversarialAction)
AdvCount+ = 1
end if
if s is terminal then
Reward+ = 1.0 ∗ (Rmax −Rt)
AdvCount← 0
end if
The proposed procedure for measuring the test-time robustness of a given
DRL policy to adversarial state perturbations is as follows:
1. If the state-action value function of the target Q∗ is not available (i.e., black-
box testing settings), approximate Q∗ from the policy using imitation learn-
ing (e.g., [6]),
2. Train the adversarial agent against the target policy π∗ in its training envi-
ronment, report the maximum adversarial regretR∗adv(T ) for time T achieved
at adversarial optimality,
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3. Apply the adversarial policy against the target for N episodes, record the
adversarial regret at the end of each episode Radv(T ),
4. Report the average of Radv(T ) over N episodes as the mean per-episode
test-time robustness of π∗ in the given environment.
5 Experiment Setup
Environment and Target Policies: To demonstrate the performance of the
proposed procedures for benchmarking the test-time robustness and resilience
in DRL policies, we present the analysis of the aforementioned measurements
for policies trained in the CartPole environment in OpenAI Gym [3]. The con-
sidered policies are chosen to represent the commonly-adopted state of the art
method from each class of DRL algorithms. From value-iteration approaches,
we consider DQN with prioritized replay. From policy gradient approaches, we
consider PPO2. As for actor-critic methods, we investigate the A2C method.
Table 5 presents the specifications of the CartPole environment, and Tables 5 –
5 provide the parameter settings of each target policy.
Table 1. Specifications of the CartPole Environment
Observation Space
Cart Position [-4.8, +4.8]
Cart Velocity [-inf, +inf]
Pole Angle [-24 deg, +24 deg]
Pole Velocity at Tip [-inf, +inf]
Action Space
0 : Push cart to the left
1 : Push cart to the right
Reward +1 for every step taken
Termination
Pole Angle is more than 12 degrees
Cart Position is more than 2.4
Episode length is greater than 500
Table 2. Parameters of DQN Policy
No. Timesteps 105
γ 0.99
Learning Rate 10−3
Replay Buffer Size 50000
First Learning Step 1000
Target Network Update Freq. 500
Prioritized Replay True
Exploration Parameter-Space Noise
Exploration Fraction 0.1
Final Exploration Prob. 0.02
Max. Total Reward 500
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Table 3. Parameters of A2C Policy
No. Timesteps 5× 105
γ 0.99
Learning Rate 7× 10−4
Entropy Coefficient 0.0
Value Function Coefficient 0.25
Max. Total Reward 500
Table 4. Parameters of A2C Policy
No. Environments 8
No. Timesteps 106
No. Runs per Environment per Update 2048
No. Minibatches per update 32
Bias-Variance Trade-Off Factor 0.95
No. Surrogate Epochs 10
γ 0.99
Learning Rate 3× 10−4
Entropy Coefficient 0.0
Value Function Coefficient 0.5
Max. Total Reward 500
Adversarial Agent: In these experiments, the adversarial agent is a DQN
agent with the hyperparameters provided in Table 5. We consider a homogeneous
perturbation cost function for all state perturbations, that is ∀s, a′ : cadv(s, a
′) =
cadv. For both the resilience and robustness measurements, we set cadv = 1 (i.e.,
each perturbation incurs a cost of 1 to the adversary). The training process is
terminated when the adversarial regret is maximized and the 100-episode average
of the number of adversarial perturbations is quasi-stable for 200 episodes.
Table 5. Parameters of DQN Policy
Max. Timesteps 105
γ 0.99
Learning Rate 10−3
Replay Buffer Size 50000
First Learning Step 1000
Target Network Update Freq. 500
Experience Selection Prioritized Replay
Exploration Parameter-Space Noise
Exploration Fraction 0.1
Final Exploration Prob. 0.02
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6 Results
6.1 Resilience Benchmarks
We consider the white-box settings in the training of adversarial agents for re-
silience measurement. For the DQN target, the optimal state-action value func-
tion Q∗ of the target is directly utilized. As for the A2C and PPO2 targets, the
state-action value function is calculated from the internally-available state value
estimations V ∗ (s) according to the following transformation:
Q∗(st, a) = r(st, a) + γV
∗(st+1) (3)
where st+1 is the state resulting from a transition out of state st by implementing
action a.
Training Results: The training progress plots of adversarial DQN policy on
the three target policies are presented in Fig.1–3. It can be seen that all three
policies converge to the same optima. However, for the adversary targeting the
DQN policies, the convergence is achieved at a higher number of training steps.
It is noteworthy that for all three policies, the mean-per-100 episodes of the
minimum number of perturbations at convergence is almost similar (as reported
in Table 6.2), with A2C having the largest value of 7.69 perturbations, PPO2 at
7.49 perturbations, and DQN having the lowest value of 7.13. Also, the test-time
performance of these trained policies indicate similar results, with DQN requiring
6.95 perturbations to incur an adversarial regret of 491.15, PPO2 requiring 7.72
perturbations for an adversarial regret of 490.47, and A2C requiring 8.71 pertur-
bations for an adversarial regret of 488.16. Accordingly, we can interpret these
results as follows: the DQN policy has the lowest adversarial resilience among the
three, followed by the PPO2 policy. Within the context of this comparison, the
A2C policy is found to be the most resilient to state-space perturbation attacks.
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Fig. 1. Adversarial Training Progress for Resilience Benchmarking of the DQN Policy
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Fig. 2. Adversarial Training Progress for Resilience Benchmarking of the A2C Policy
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Fig. 3. Adversarial Training Progress for Resilience Benchmarking of the PPO2 Policy
6.2 Test-Time Step-Perturbation Distribution:
To investigate the state-transition vulnerability of each policy, we also study
the frequency of perturbing states at each timestep of an episode for the three
adversarial policies. The results, presented in Fig. 4 – 6 illustrate that in all three
policies, the initial timesteps have been the subject of most perturbations. This
result is noteworthy, as it contradicts with the assumption of Lin et al.[7] that
the most effective adversarial perturbations are those that are mounted towards
the terminal state of the environment.
Table 6. Comparison of Test-Time and Training-Time Resilience Measurements for
DQN, A2C, and PPO2 Policies
Target Policy Max. Regret Avg. Regret (Training) Avg. No. Perturbations (Training) Avg. Regret Avg. No. Perturbations
DQN 492 491.24 7.13 491.15 6.95
A2C 492 491.44 7.69 488.16 8.71
PPO2 492 491.72 7.49 490.47 7.72
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Fig. 4. Perturbation Count Per Episodic TimeStep in 100 Runs Targeting DQN Policy
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Fig. 5. Perturbation Count Per Episodic TimeStep in 100 Runs Targeting A2C Policy
6.3 Robustness Benchmarks
To demonstrate the performance of our proposed technique for benchmarking
the robustness of DRL policies, we provide the training-time results for two cases
of δmax = 10 and δmax = 5 for DQN, A2C, and PPO2 Policies. As illustrated in
Fig.7 – 9, all three adversarial policies converge with similar minimum pertur-
bation counts as those obtained in resilience analysis. This is expected, as the
resilience analysis established that the minimum number of actions required for
maximum regret is 7.5, which is less than the available budget of δmax = 10 As
for the case of δmax = 5, Fig.10 – 12 demonstrate significant differences between
the three policies. In Fig.10, it can be seen that at 5 actions, the convergence
occurs with an adversarial regret of 462.5, while for A2C, the best 5-action in-
dication of convergence occurs at an adversarial regret of 224. As for PPO2,
this value is at 268.2. These results indicate a similar ranking of the robustness
in these policies, with DQN being the least-robust to maximum of 5 pertur-
bations, and the A2C prevailing as the most robust policy to maximum of 5
perturbations.
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Fig. 6. Perturbation Count Per Episodic TimeStep in 100 Runs Targeting PPO Policy
6.4 Case 1: δmax = 10:
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Fig. 7. Adversarial Training Progress for Robustness Benchmarking - DQN, δmax = 10
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Fig. 8. Adversarial Training Progress for Robustness Benchmarking - A2C, δmax = 10
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Fig. 9. Adversarial Training Progress for Robustness Benchmarking - PPO2, δmax = 10
6.5 Case 2: δmax = 5:
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Fig. 10. Adversarial Training Progress for Robustness Benchmarking - DQN, δmax = 5
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Fig. 11. Adversarial Training Progress for Robustness Benchmarking - A2C, δmax = 5
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Fig. 12. Adversarial Training Progress for Robustness Benchmarking - PPO2, δmax =
5
7 Conclusion
We presented two RL-based techniques for benchmarking the resilience and ro-
bustness of DRL policies to adversarial perturbations of state transition dynam-
ics. Experimental evaluation of our proposals demonstrate the feasibility of these
techniques for quantitative analysis of policies with regards to their sensitivity to
state transition dynamics. A promising venue of further exploration is to study
and extend the proposed methodologies for evaluation of generalization in DRL
policies.
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